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interests of himself and others similarly situated." Nor should there be a
stay if a state-court defendant should ever be able to show that the state
suit had been brought solely to frustrate and delay his valid claim against
the state-court plaintiff."5 There should also be discretion to stay if the
federal plaintiff's cause of action has arisen after suit was filed against him
in the state forum. In this case, he has had no opportunity to choose his
forum prior to commencement of the state suit, and his current choice might
be honored even though the two causes of action turn on a common issue,
such as the construction of a contract or the scope of one party's agency.
Except for unusual situations such as these, however, practical considera-
tions- favor stays of federal actions which duplicate state suits, just as in
other instances of duplicate proceedings.
LAUDATORY MISREPRESENTATION OF CREDIT STANDING"
ACCuRATE information concerning a man's ability to repay his obligations
is vital to the proper functioning of our highly complex credit economy.
Since personal knowledge is seldom the rule today, the prospective creditor
must rely on statements furnished by credit agencies, banks or individuals
who have the necessary first-hand information.' Their misrepresentations of
54. See notes 29, 30, and 31 supra. Here the arguments for a stay because of burdens
on courts and defendants is less persuasive. The defendants, who are seeking to settle
for less than their true liability, deserve little protection. And the court may eventually
be put to the trouble of another trial anyway, since a showing of fraud or collusion in the
first suit makes possible a successful attack on the judgment there rendered. BALLA.;.E,
CoRpo0ATros § 155 (rev. ed. 1946).
55. For example, a plaintiff may bring a state suit purposely to forestall any federal
proceedings by a needy opponent and to utilize crowded dockets in the state court, see note
25 supra, as a means of forcing him into an unfair settlement. The state-court defend-
ant's subsequent federal suit raising the same issues should not then be stayed.
* People v. Rockwell, 275 App. Div. 563, 90 N.Y.S2d 281 (1st Dep't 1949), aff'd
wvithout opinion, 300 N.Y. 557, 89 N.E2d 521 (1949).
1. The extent to which creditors rely on information furnished by others is indicated
by the activities of credit rating agencies. Dun & Bradstreet made 7,537,283 investigations
in 1948; 2,904,200 inquiries were answered with "analytical" or "specialized" reports. Dui;
& BARnsTmRT, ANNuAL RE.PoRT 1948. See PROCHNOW & FOULKE, PAc'ncAL BA,,n CREDIr
68 (1939). The Credit Bureau of Greater New York has over 5,000,000 names on file, and
in normal times receives 3,000 inquiries daily. Green, They Get All the Credit, Nation's
Business, March, 1945, p. 62, 65. For a description of credit agencies, see Procxnzow &
FouLimr op. cit.supra, cc. III-VI.
According to J. l Chapman, 141 banks have reported that "the most important source
of credit information concerning applicants for personal loans is the bank's own commercial
credit department; the outside sources were ranked ... in the following order of im-
portance: retail credit exchange agencies, the applicant's employer, his bank, his creditors,
mercantile credit agencies, and bank and other personal loan credit exchange bureaus."
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the future debtor's financial position, may therefore cause the creditor con-
siderable harm. While a sense of business morality and civil remedies in
tort tends to curb such abuses of trust, criminal sanctions may also be de-
sirable if accurate credit information is to be assured.
2
In People v. Rockwell,3 however, the Appellate Division of the New York
Supreme Court refused to apply a criminal sanction against a party who
knowingly made a false statement of fact regarding a prospective debtor's
financial responsibility. Title Guarantee and Trust Co., under its program
of accounts receivable financing, maintained a running account for one
Benjamin, president of Metropolitan Machine Shops, Inc.4 Early in 1946,
TG&T, fearing that Metropolitan's accounts receivable were not sound,
conducted an investigation which seemed to confirm their suspicions.
Before full repayment could be obtained, four lending institutions asked
TG&T for information concerning Benjamin's credit standing., TG&T re-
plied to each that the account was "satisfactory." ' One of the inquiring
firms thereupon made a loan to Benjamin who then repaid the TG&T loan
in full. Shortly thereafter, the new creditor discovered that Metropolitan's
accounts receivable were fictitious. Metropolitan was put into involuntary
bankruptcy, and Benjamin was sentenced to from ten to twenty years after
pleading guilty to charges of grand larceny and forgery.'
CHAPMAN, COMMERCIAL BANKS AND CONSUMER INSTALMENT CaIDIT 92 (1940). For the
sources used in other lending fields in appraising the financial condition of the prospective
debtor see PHELPs, IMPORTANT STraS IN RETAIL CaErr OPERATION cc. 3,12 (1947) "
SAULNER & JACOBY, ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE FINANCING 109-117 (1943); SAULNI It,
INDUsTRiAL BANKING COMPANIES AND THEIR CREDIT PRACTICES 102-103, 119-145 (1940);
YOUNG, PERsoNA. FINANCE COMPANIES AND THIR CREDIT PRAcrICEs 89-106 (1940). See
also JACOBY & SAULNER, TERM LENDING TO BUSINESS 89-91 (1942) (Federal Reserve
Banks and RFC methods are, in broad outline, the same as commercial banks. Id. at 90).
2. See pages 994-7 infra.
False statements made without knowledge of their falsity have been made criminal in
some jurisdictions, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 502.26 (1949) (statementi made to State Se-
curities Commissioner), State v. Dobry, 217 Iowa 858, 250 N.W. 702 (1933), appeal dis-
inissed, 293 U.S. 519 (1934) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2:107-1 (1939) (false advertising), State
v. Silverman, 116 N.J.L. 242, 183 Atl. 178 (1936).
3. 275 App. Div. 568, 90 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1st Dep't 1949), aff'd without opinion, 300
N.Y. 557, 89 N.E.2d 521 (1949).
4. The accounts were assigned on a non-notification basis.
5. It is standard practice for banks to release credit information to responsible in-
quirers and ask for the same service in return. Many banks in large cities maintain separate
departments which do nothing but collect and disseminate such information. See Brief for
Appellants, pp. 11, 12, People v. Rockvell, 275 App. Div. 568, 90 N.Y.S. 2d 281 (1st Dep't
1949) ; Brief for Appellants, p. 3, People v. Rockwell, 300 N.Y. 557, 89 N.E.2d 521 (1949).
See also note I spra.
6. Brief for Respondent, pp. 6,7, People v. Rockwell, 275 App. Div. 568, 90 N.Y.S.2d
281 (1st Dep't 1949). Defendants also stated that they would hate to lose Benjamin's
account, that they regarded him "very highly" and considered him a good "moral risk,"
Brief for Appellant, pp. 8,9, People v. Rockwell, 300 N.Y. 557, 89 N.E.2d 521 (1949).
7. For a more detailed account of Benjamin's activities,, see Kurtz, I Get 'Em When
They're Broke, Sat. Eve. Post, Jan. 21, 1950, pp. 24, 73-4.
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The District Attorney then initiated criminal proceedings against TG&T
and its employees who had participated in the misrepresentation. 8 The in-
dictment was based on Section 926-a of the New York Penal Law which
broadly prohibits the circulation of false statements of fact knowingly made
about the financial responsibility of any person, firm or corporation with
intent that the information be relied upon.9 A jury found the defendants
guilty, 0 but the Appellate Division reversed on two alternative grounds:
first, that knowledge of the falsity had not been proved beyond a reasonable
doubt; and second, that the legislature intended to prohibit only false deroga-
tory statements-since the defendant's statements were "laudatory"
Section 926-a did not apply. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate
Division without opinion."
The Appellate Division reached its second holding after examining the
scanty and uninformative history of the statute. Although Section 926-a is
not confined by its terms to derogatory statements only, it was placed under
the Libel article of the Penal Law upon its passage in 1933.12 Seven years
later the Law Revision Commission removed the section from the Lib&i
article and placed it under Frauds and Cheats "for logical arrangement.""13
The Appellate Division, inferring an initial legislative intent to confine the
statute to derogatory statements, concluded that this locational change did
not expand its terms to include laudatory statements as well. The contrary
inference, however, would be more plausible. There would have been no
reason to remove Section 926-a from the Libel article "for logical arrange-
ment" if it were confined to derogatory statements.
There-is, of course, a great practical difference between these two inter-
pretations. The Appellate Division, by confining Section 926-a to deroga-
8. The individual defendants were the vice-president in charge of banking, an assistant
vice-president, and a bank clerk, head of the credit department.
9. "Any person who knowingly and wilfully states, delivers or transmits by any means
whatever to any person, firm or corporation, any false and untrue statements of a fact con-
cerning the financial responsibility of any person, firm or corporation, with intent that the
same shall be acted upon, is guilty of a misdemeanor." N.Y. PEzAl. LAw § 926-a. Com-
pare M.& REv. STAT. c.117, § 35 (1944). People v. Rochwcell is the first reported case
brought under § 926-a. The indictment also contained a count charging the individual
defendants with conspiracy to violate the section.
10. The bank was fined $2,500. Its vice-president received a suspended sentence, the
assistant ivice-president received six months in the workhouse, and the bank clerk received
a six-months suspended sentence. Brief for Appellants, pp. 4,5, People v. Rockwell, 275
App. Div. 568, 90 N.Y.S2d 281 (1st Dep't 1949).
11. 300 N.Y. 557, S9 N.E2d 521 (1949).
12. N.Y. Laws 1933, c. 422, § 1354.
13. N.Y. Laws 1940, c. 561, §4. See Sax, JouwwAx, 1288 (N.Y. 1940): "Note: For
logical arrangement this section is transferred from article 126 relating to Libel to article
86, relating to Frauds and Cheats." The change was accomplished by a Revision Bill, a
term employed "to indicate those bills recommended by the Commission to make changes
in the statutes merely in matters of form." LAw R.v. Com z;', REFonT, REco=A.DT.*,ToN.s
A.D Sionms 407n. (1940). The wording of the statute was not changed.
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tory statements, 14 protects only the person about whom a statement is
made. Construction of the statute to include commendatory statements
also protects the creditor who relies on the information.1"
By refusing to extend criminal sanctions, the Appellate Division has left
prospective creditors to rely on existing curbs on false laudatory state-
ments-business morality and civil remedies in tort. Neither of these is
adequate. Although unwritten codes of ethics undoubtedly govern the
businessman's conduct in large part, honesty is still not regarded as the
best policy in many varied business transactions.1" Moreover, civil remedies
penalizing the person who knowingly makes a false commendatory state-
ment 17 are ineffective deterrents. The maker of the false statement may
well consider the prize worth the gamble, for the injured party has the
burden of showing that he relied on the false information and that this
reliance was the cause of his loss. 8
14. So confined, § 926-a is still an extension over previous criminal statutes. N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 1340 already prohibits written "nalicious" statements having a tendency to
injure any person in his business or occupation, and N.Y. PENAL LAW §303, 1204 pro-
hibit oral derogatory statements against banks and insurance companies, see State v.
Kollar, 93 Ohio St. 89, 112 N.E. 196 (1915), a protection which § 926-a gives to "any
person, firm or corporation."
15. Present false pretenses statutes are not flexible enough to include this situation.
See note 23 infra.
16. See, e.g., SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME (1949) passim, and BARNES &
TEETERS, NEW HORIZONS IN CRIMINOLOGY 41-55 (1943), which indicate that the facts of
the Rockwell case are not completely aberrational.
17. See generally PRoSSER, TORTS c. 16 (1941). When a false statement concerns
financial responsibility, the most widely used form of recovery is the action of deceit. The
injured party can recover where the falsifier misrepresented another's financial position,
Pasley v. Freeman, 3 D. & E. 51, 100 Eng. Rep. 450 (1789); 1-1. D. Sojourner & Co. v.
Joseph, 186 Miss. 755, 191 So. 418 (1939), as well as his own, whether made directly to the
injured party, First State Say. Bank v. Dake, 250 Mich. 525, 231 N.W. 135 (1930), or
through a third party-usually a mercantile agency. Davis v. Louisville Trust Co., 181
Fed. 10 (6th Cir. 1910) ; Penn Anthracite Mining Co. v. Clarkson Securities Co., 205 Mini.
517, 287 N.W. 15 (1939) ; Jamestown Iron & Metal Co. v. Knofsky, 291 Pa. 60, 139 Atl,
611 (1927).
The expansion of remedies for false statements is discussed in Harper & McNeely,
A Synthesis of the Law of Misrepresentation, 22 MINNx. L. REv. 939 (1938) ; Green, Deceit,
16 VA. L. REV. 749 (1930).
18. E.g., Standard Surety & Casualty Co. v. Plantsville Nat. Bank, 158 F.2d 422 (2d
Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 812 (1947) ; Hindman v. First Nat. Bank of Louisville,
112 Fed. 931 (6th Cir. 1902), cert. denied, 186 U.S. 483 (1902) ; Farmer's Savings Bank
v. Jameson, 175 Iowa 676, 157 N.W. 460 (1916); cf. Masche v. Nichols, 188 Va. 857, 51
S.E2d 144 (1949).
Other difficult problems of proof may discourage the injured party from bringing suit.
The falsity of the statement must be proved by the plaintiff. Shriver v. Fourth Nat. Bank,
121 Kan. 388, 247 Pac. 443 (1926); Park & Tilford Import Corp. v. Passaic Nat. Bank
& Trust Co., 129 NJ.L. 436, 30 A.2d 24 (1943). In addition, the plaintiff must usually
show that the statement was knowingly made. Jorgensen v. Albertson, 129 Wash. 686, 225
Pac. 639 (1924). But see Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
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A criminal sanction such as Section 926-a, on the other hand, is likely
to be a more persuasive deterrent. To be sure, it requires that knowledge
of the falsity be proved beyond reasonable doubt, a requirement that proved
a stumbling block in the Rockwell case. 19 But it does not require proof of
loss or proof that the false statement caused the loss. Moreover, the pos-
sibility of a criminal trial, whether or not a conviction results, is something
to reckon with in the credit rating field. 2 A charge of misrepresentation not
only subjects a person to the general stigma of being involved in criminal
proceedings, 2' but also damages the very reputation for honesty and
Relief has been granted, however, for reckless or negligent statements under special cir-
cumstances. Sovereign Pocohontas Co. v. Bond, 120 F2d 39 (D.C. Cir. 1941) ; see also
Harper & McNeely, suepra note 17 at 955-90. Moreover, the false statement must have been
one of fact, not opinion. Shine v. Dodge, 130 fe. 440, 157 At. 318 (1931). Furthermore,
an injured party who seeks to recover from a bank or other employer must show that the
falsifying employee was acting within the scope of his employment, e.g., Oppenheimer v.
Harriman Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 301 U.S. 206, 212 (1937) ; Standard Surety & Casualty
Co. v. Plantsville Nat. Bank, 158 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. dcnicd, 331 U.S. 812 (1947),
or that benefit was received by the employer, e.g., Martin v. Gotham Nat. Bank, 248
N.Y. 313, 162 N.E. 91 (1928).
The deterrent effect of the civil remedy is further- lessened by the ever-present pos-
sibility that a suit can be settled out of court. Such a settlement entails little or no adverse
publicity, and may in fact result in the falsifier gaining more than he has lost in the affair.
19. Section 926-a requires not only that the false statement be knowingly made, but
also that it be made with intent that it be relied upon. The latter requirement would seem
to be an undesirable addition to a prosecutor's burden of proof. But practically speaking
it should make no difference in credit-information cases. A prospective creditor almost
invariably seeks information for the purposes of relying on it, and every supplier is well
aware of this fact. Thus in most cases intent may be conclusively presumed.
20. Although the effectiveness of criminal sanctions as a deterrent has been questioned,
careful writers have distinguished between professional and non-professional law-breakers.
See HAL, Tn=, LAW. AND Sociry 293-4 (1935): "[Rleduction of criminality by deter-
rence through fear of punishment has never been demonstrated, but if coupled mith other-
wise effective administration, is a common-sense probability among non-professionals.!
(author's emphasis).
Moreover, the Rockwell situation should be distinguished from the situations where
criminal sanctions have not worked well against businessmen, e.g., where the crime is
committed against a vague entity such as "the stockholders," "the general public," or
"consumers," or where businessmen violate laws with which a substantial majority of the
business community do not agree politically .or economically. See SuTHERmLaN, WHrTE
COLLAR CRanx (1949). In contrast, a businessman who disseminates false credit informa-
tion to other businessmen directly injures a member of his own group whose approval he
especially desires and needs. A criminal sanction here has the great advantage of publiciz-
ing the falsifier's conduct in the most adverse way. See SUTHELAND, WHITE COLL=
Caxmn 219-20 (1949) : "[A] violation of the legal code is not necessarily a violation of the
business code. Prestige is lost by violation of the business code but not by violation of the
legal code except when the legal code coincides with the business code." See also HALL,
THEF, LAW AND Socmy 294 (1935).
21. See Berge, Remedies Available to the Government Under the Sherlaon Act, 7 LAw
& Coxrin. PRoB. 104, 111 (1940) ; M. Cohen, Moral Aspects of the Criminal Low, 49
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accuracy on which his business success depends. 22
The appropriateness of criminal sanctions has been recognized by legis-
latures in situations analogous to the Rockwell case. The Federal Securities
Act 23 and many state blue sky laws 24 make the misrepresentation of a
corporation's financial condition criminal. In the field of credit rating many
states, including New York, have false financial statement statutes 2 which
Y=uE LJ. 987, 1019, 1022 (1940) ; SUTHERLAND, WHITE Cou.A CiuME 225 (1949).
22. A criminal sanction seems potentially more damaging than a civil sanction for two
reasons. First, most civil suits can be kept from ever seeing the light of day by out-of-
court settlement before a complaint is brought. Unless he feels in a vindictive mood, tile
prospective plaintiff will be only too happy to avoid the time and trouble-and risk--of a
formal court action. On the other hand, the public prosecutor with ample evidence has no
similar reason for dropping his case. Second, a civil suit even though instituted is not
likely to prove as damaging as a criminal charge. Many civil suits are brought without
any real prospect of success. In contrast, criminal proceedings are rarely instituted with-
out a comfortable accumulation of evidence. Thus the public at large will ordinarily give
much more credence to the latter than to the former. Cf. Berge, Remedies Available Under
the Sherman. Act, 7 LAw & CoNTEmp. PRoB. 104, 111 (1940) % "While civil penalties may
be as severe in their financial effect as criminal penalties, yet they do not involve the stigma
that attends indictment and conviction." And see note 20 supra.
23. 48 STAT. 87 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1946), and 48 STAT. 904 (1934), as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1946). See Crooker v. SEC, 161 F.2d 944 (1st Cir. 1947) ; Batik of
America v. Douglas, 105 F.2d 100 (D.C. Cir. 1939). For a discussion of these statutes see
Herlands, Criminal Law Aspects of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 21 VA. L. REv.
139 (1934) ; Maclntyre, Criminal Provisions of the Securities Act and Analogies to Similar
Criminal Statutes, 43 YALE L.J. 254 (1933). The English courts likewise punish such mis-
representations, Rex v. Kylsant, [1932] 1 K.B. 442 (1931).
For similar criminal penalties in related fields where accurate information is also vital
and difficult to obtain, see 53 STAT. 1176-7, (1939), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77www-yyy (1946)
(Trust Indenture Act) and 54 STAT. 846, 853, 857 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-48, 80b-,7, 8,
17 (1946) (Investment Companies and Advisors Act).
24. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. c. 817, § 817.34 (1944) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 121y, § 127
(Smith-Hurd, 1936); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 421, 926, 952; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 52
(Purdon, 1931) ; Tax. Rmv. PENAL CODE art. 1083a (Vernon, 1948). See generally CCH,
BLUE SKY LAW REP. (1946). See note 2 .upra.
25. A model statute, formulated by the National Association of Credit Men, has been
widely adopted. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAw § 1293-b which punishes any person (1) who
knowingly makes a false written statement of financial condition, intending it to be relied
upon, for the purpose of procuring personal property, cash or credit, or (2) who knowingly
procures the designated property on the faith of another's false written statement, or (3)
procures property on the faith of a false statement to the effect that a previous statement
continues to be true.
This statute does away with many of the difficulties of prosecuting under false pre-
tenses statutes, formerly the only sanction against such conduct. See NATIONAL ASS'N or
CREDIT MEN, CREDIT MANUAL OF COmmERcIAL LAWS 1949 344-7 (1948). Under these
statutes it is often difficult to prove that the accused obtained the property as a result of the
false statement. Treadwell v. State, 99 Ga. 779, 27 S.E. 785 (1896); Commonwealth v.
Randle, 180 AtI. 720 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1935), 36 COL. L. REV. 838 (1936). In addition, some
states have held that obtaining credit by false pretenses is not punishable because "credit"
is not "property" within the meaning of the statutes. Lochner v. State, 218 Wis. 472, 261
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